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Introduction
Elisabeth of Bohemia was the first of Descartes' interlocutors to give a detailed statement of, and 
propose a solution to, the problem of mind-body interaction, and the only one to receive a detailed 
reply, unsatisfactory though she clearly found it. Elisabeth queried how an immaterial soul could, 
compatibly with the mechanistic physics she and Descartes endorsed, move or be moved by an 
extended body. She also tentatively suggested that the soul might be extended. Elisabeth’s re-
marks on the topic are tantalisingly brief, and her letters are her only known philosophical works. 
Since we do not know how she would have expanded these suggestions into a philosophical trea-
tise, it has been difficult to determine how we should extrapolate from her very compressed state-
ments to a fully-fledged philosophical theory. Descartes appears to have taken Elisabeth’s position 
as a confused version of his own, advising her to ‘freely attribute this matter and this extension to 
the soul; for that is nothing but to conceive it united to the body' (Descartes to Elisabeth, 28 June 
1643, repr. in Shapiro, 2007a, p. 71). Recent commentators have hailed Elisabeth instead as hav-
ing a consistent and original metaphysic, not a handmaiden to, but a rival of, Cartesian dualism. 
Some interpret her as a materialist — principally Lisa Shapiro (2007b, pp. 41-3), who attributes to 
her a novel, non-reductive physicalism, but also Deborah Tollefsen (1999) who believes Elisabeth’s 
solution to the mind-body problem is that of Hobbes and Gassendi. Others, especially Andrea Nye 
(1999, p. vii), regard her as proposing her own distinctive anti-dualist ontology. In this paper I 
present a new reading of Elisabeth as having a distinctive but dualist position, deriving from an ef-
fort to improve upon Descartes’ metaphysics, and apparently informed both by a rejection of 
Scholasticism and by a kind of proto-naturalism, seeking a philosophy informed by the deliver-
ances of the sciences. 
A keen scholar of the new seventeenth-century mechanistic physics and an enthusiast of 
the gender-neutral and science-friendly aspects of Cartesian methodology, Elisabeth, I claim, took 
this method further than Descartes himself. In doing so she exposed some vestiges of the old 
ways which lingered in his system, and attempted alternative explanations which would dispense 
with them. What she objected to, I argue, was not dualism per se, but the residual Scholasticism of 
Descartes' account of mind-body causality and his dogmatism about principal attributes. She dis-
missed Descartes' Aristotelian story about our awareness of mind-body union, and his claim that 
mind-body causation can only be understood phenomenologically. Instead, Elisabeth pressed him 
further for a mechanistic explanation. She also challenged Descartes' categorisation of the ‘action’ 
of thought as mind's principal attribute, and his identification of it with the merely negative property 
of immateriality. Elisabeth held that the nature of the mind stood in need of further philosophical 
and empirical scrutiny. I problematise the materialist interpretation of Elisabeth with reference to 
later letters in which she rejected the Objections of Hobbes and Gassendi, and continued to urge 
further clarifications to Cartesian dualism on the mechanistic model. I explore Elisabeth's contrast-
ing of statements of mechanistic physics with statements about thought, and her call for additional 
research into the properties of the mind, including by empirical means. On this basis I argue that 
she endorses a form of dualism, and suggest that she might be read as a naturalistic dualist, that 
is, a dualist who is open to philosophical conclusions being challenged and shaped by empirical 
results, and aims for philosophical and scientific investigation of the psychological and the physical 
to be brought into harmony.
Elisabeth of Bohemia: Life and Works
Elisabeth was born at Heidelberg Castle on 26 December 1618. Her parents were Elizabeth Stu-
art, the daughter of James I of England, VI of Scotland, and Frederick V Elector Palatine.  When 1
Elisabeth was a toddler, Frederick briefly became King of Bohemia as part of a revolt against the 
 For a fascinatingly detailed biography of Elisabeth, see Shapiro 2007b, pp. 7-16.1
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Holy Roman Empire. He lasted less than a year. The family fled to the Netherlands, where Elisa-
beth and her ten siblings were very well educated. Jacqueline Broad suggests that Elisabeth was 
taught by professors of the University of Leiden (Broad 2002, p. 16), and Shapiro conjectures that 
she was also tutored by Constantijn Huygens (Shapiro 2007b, p. 5). One of Elisabeth's sisters, 
Louise, was a well-known painter in her youth and in later life an abbess, who introduced Elisabeth 
and Malebranche. Another sister, Sophie, became electress of Hanover and patroness of Leibniz, 
whom she also introduced to Elisabeth. One brother, Rupert, was a notable chemist and — like 
several of the others — a military officer, while the eldest, Charles Louis, eventually gained back 
some of the Palatine land and revivified the University of Heidelberg. 
Elisabeth was a tireless diplomat on behalf of her family. Involved in writing state letters for 
her mother from her late teens, she soon graduated to negotiating the release of Rupert, who had 
been made a prisoner of war while fighting on behalf of their uncle, Charles I. Such political activity 
was unusual for even the most educated of seventeenth-century women. Those who were not roy-
alty were commonly advised to study politics only theoretically (van Schurman 1659, Shapiro 
2007b, p. 4). Also unusual was Elisabeth’s proficiency in the study of the new mechanistic physics 
and the latest developments in mathematics. She astounded Descartes with her proof, much more 
elegant than his own, in the emerging discipline of algebraic geometry (Descartes to Elisabeth, 17 
November 1643, repr. in Shapiro 2007a, pp. 73-7). Her opinion was sought after by other profes-
sional mathematicians, too. John Pell advised a fellow scholar to study her proof (Shapiro 2007b, 
p. 13; Pell’s letter is in the British Library, additional mss. 4365.f.198), and the University of Leiden 
took her advice on the appointment of the Cartesian mathematician van Schooten (Elisabeth to 
Descartes, 27 December 1645, repr. in Shapiro 2007a, pp. 88-91). Elisabeth was proficient in Latin 
and classical Greek and fluent in French, German and English. At one point in their correspon-
dence we find her reassuring Descartes that Digby's English-language criticisms of the Dioptrics 
were based on a complete misinterpretation (Elisabeth to Descartes, 24 May 1645, repr. in Shapiro 
2007a, pp. 172-4). She first wrote to Descartes in 1643, after reading the Meditations. They ex-
changed letters regularly until Descartes’ death in 1650. Although I will focus on their discussion of 
dualism and mechanistic explanations, the correspondence covers an exceptionally wide range of 
philosophical topics, from physics and mathematics to Stoicism and moral philosophy. Descartes’ 
exchanges with Elisabeth were clearly a significant influence on him. He dedicated his Principles of 
Philosophy to her in 1644, and developed themes from the correspondence into his Passions of 
the Soul. Elisabeth, for her part, provides in these letters the clearest and most extensive expres-
sion of her philosophical views which has been handed down to us. If she wrote any longer philo-
sophical works, they have not survived, at least not under her own name. She expressed reluc-
tance about sharing with the world even those views expressed in her letters, refusing publication 
of her side of the correspondence when Descartes had died and a volume of his letters was being 
planned.2
Elisabeth remained politically active throughout her thirties, negotiating a younger sister’s 
marriage and planning a diplomatic mission to see the Queen Mother of Sweden about the Treaty 
of Westphalia, a treaty which resulted in her family’s securing a modest portion of the original Pala-
tine lands (Elisabeth to Descartes July 1648 and 23 August 1648, repr. in Shapiro 2007a, pp. 172-
4). In her forties, Elisabeth chose a monastic life at the protestant convent in Herford, first as coad-
jutrix, and soon afterwards as abbess. In that capacity she offered sanctuary to Quakers, Labadists 
and other persecuted sects. She corresponded with Malebranche and Leibniz on philosophical 
themes, though never as extensively as she had with Descartes. Leibniz visited her on her sickbed 
in 1680. Elisabeth died soon afterwards, on 8 February. 
The Arguments of Descartes’ Meditations and Elisabeth’s Anti-Scholastic Perspective Upon 
Them
Elisabeth’s first few letters to Descartes concern the substance dualism he expresses in his Medi-
tations. Descartes’ quest for certainty in this work had led him to some radical breaks with the 
 As a result, Elisabeth’s letters were lost until the nineteenth century (Shapiro 2007b, p. 5). No full 2
English-language edition was available until Shapiro’s excellent translation appeared in 2007.
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Scholastic orthodoxy. The fact that mind-body dualism, the idea that the soul (or mind — like 
Descartes and Elisabeth, I will use the words interchangeably) is really distinct from the body, was 
one of them, is insufficiently appreciated. It is often supposed, in some vague way, that Christianity 
presupposes soul-body dualism  and that the prevalence of Christianity in seventeenth-century 3
Europe implies that dualism, too, must have been the prevailing view. In fact, the commonly held 
and orthodox Scholastic view was Aristotelian hylomorphism, according to which the soul is the 
substantial form of the body. A human being was thought to be some matter informed by a rational 
soul, not wholly a person after death until he or she is made whole again by the resurrection of the 
body (Pasnau 2011, p. 60). Part of my case in this paper will be that Elisabeth’s views on the mind-
body problem are inspired by anti-Scholasticism. She claimed as one advantage of her view that ‘it 
makes one abandon the contradiction of the Scholastics, that it [the soul] is both as a whole in the 
whole body and as a whole in each of its parts’ (Elisabeth to Descartes 1 July 1643, repr. in 
Shapiro 2007a, p. 72). 
Descartes, who claims in the Meditations (rather dubiously) to demonstrate the immortality 
of the soul, is partly to blame for the misinterpretation that his dualism is just expounding main-
stream Christianity.  But the arguments he offers for the real distinction between mind and body, 
the argument from divisibility and the epistemological argument, are purely philosophical argu-
ments, and they are so by design. Descartes deliberately proposed a philosophical method acces-
sible to any rational creature, no matter her philosophical or religious education — a method Elisa-
beth enthusiastically embraced (Elisabeth to Descartes, 16 August 1645, repr. in Shapiro 2007a, 
pp. 99-101). I read Elisabeth’s approach to mind and body, causality and the question of principal 
attributes as the result of what she views as a more consistent application of this Cartesian 
method, which includes the aim of making philosophical conclusions consistent with empirical in-
vestigation of the world. Like Broad (2002, p. 15), I think of Elisabeth as a Cartesian sympathiser in 
her philosophical approach and metaphysical outlook, but for different reasons from the ones 
Broad cites. Broad and other feminist scholars emphasise how Elisabeth’s experiences as a 
woman shaped her views. I read Elisabeth, who was equally proficient in mathematics, physics 
and philosophy, as particularly drawn not just to Descartes’ first philosophy but also to his attempts 
to connect philosophy to the new mechanistic science and its causal explanations. I see her as 
motivated by an opposition to Scholasticism, and by a kind of proto-naturalism, allowing empirical 
results to inform and call into question our philosophical preconceptions. 
Descartes, now commonly regarded as a rationalist deeply invested in innate ideas and a 
priori knowledge, was also an active researcher working in several branches of science, and one 
who made efforts — some more successful than others — to make his philosophical views consis-
tent with the latest discoveries. As we will see, he expended such efforts on his dualism as well as 
his views on matter and causality. Her letters suggest that Elisabeth considered Cartesianism a 
breath of fresh air compared to the old Scholastic ways. By ‘Scholastic’ I will mean only the late 
Scholasticism which dominated seventeenth-century intellectual life. In taking her perspective upon 
seventeenth-century Scholasticism on board without questioning it I of course do not mean to dis-
parage Scholasticism, a broad and varied movement, in its entirety. Elisabeth’s gender features 
less prominently in my interpretation than in those of, for instance, Harth (1992, p. 74), who attrib-
utes to Elisabeth a subjectivity-based feminist epistemology, Nye, who asserts Elisabeth’s ‘nondu-
alist metaphysics of thinking body and material mind’ (1999, p. xii) comes ‘from the concerns of life, 
concerns of a young woman presented with challenges that taxed both soul and body’ (1999, p. 
12), and Broad, who regards Elisabeth’s emphasis on the role of the body and the emotions as 
flowing from a woman’s experience (2002, p. 15). Still, there is a feminist element to my anti-
Scholastic reading of her, too. Elisabeth’s preference for a method available to any rational thinker 
over one associated with the deeply conservative and sexist institutions of her time is likely con-
nected to its capacity to take her seriously as a female reasoner. Aristotle’s association of the mas-
culine with reason, form and action, and of the feminine with matter and passivity, was frequently 
used as a justification for sexism by established scholars in the early modern period (King and Ra-
 This vague supposition is so pervasive that several Christian philosophers now feel they have to 3
defend at length the thesis that Christians need not be dualists. See Rudder Baker 1995 and van 
Inwagen 1978. 
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bil, 2007, p. x-xi). By contrast, dualism has great potential as a metaphysical basis for gender 
equality (also see Ready 2002). The narrator of the Meditations might have any gender or none at 
all. As Cartesian meditators, we are all equally thinking things. 
Although the real distinction between mind and body is not explicitly defended until the 
Sixth Meditation, like Margaret Dauler Wilson (1978, p. 71) I see the arc of Descartes’ argument for 
our having an essentially thinking nature as beginning with the intrinsically first-personal move from 
‘cogito’ to ‘sum res cogitans’ in the Second Meditation. With the certainty of ‘I exist’ firmly in place, 
the meditator explores her own attributes, aiming for knowledge of the same indubitable status not 
just of the existence of the self, but of its nature. She rejects an account of herself as the Aris-
totelian ‘rational animal’, of her characteristics as including nutrition and locomotion. All of these 
admit of doubt. Only the fact that she thinks, is conscious, is something she, first-personally, can-
not doubt. Only this is something of which she can be certain that it belongs to her nature. One 
vexed question for Cartesian dualism is whether the meditator can be sure that cogitatio — gener-
ally translated ‘thought’, but according to Anscombe and Geach (1954) more correctly rendered 
‘consciousness’ or ‘experience’ — is her only nature. Elisabeth asked a version of this question: 
could it be that the soul has multiple natures, that it is both conscious and extended?  4
Raising the question of multiple natures is easily conflated with advocating materialism. 
 I argue that in Elisabeth’s case, it would be a mistake to infer materialism from her suggestion that 
the soul might possess both extension and consciousness. The inference from the soul’s having 
multiple natures to the soul’s being material relies on two hidden premises. The first is commonly 
taken for granted, but is nevertheless a substantial premise: that there are substances and attrib-
utes, and that the soul or mind is a substance, to which two natures are attributed. Materialism 
does not follow merely from attributing two natures to the soul. A second premise is needed: that 
the two natures are actually only one, that is, that the substance in question really only has a mate-
rial nature.  
Textual evidence suggests that Elisabeth had qualms about the second hidden premise. 
She certainly disavowed reductionism about mind and body. I read her letters as revealing further 
reservations about the first hidden premise, the Scholastically-inspired substance-attribute model. 
Although Elisabeth did not contest the existence of substances and attributes, she made interest-
ing attempts to undermine Descartes’ ontology of substance, attribute and mode. His ontology was 
modelled on Aristotle’s as interpreted by the late Scholastics: substances, capable of independent 
existence, are each characterised by exactly one principal attribute, which manifests itself by its 
distinctive modes.  Attributes and modes depend on the substance for their existence. Assuming 5
this Scholastic ontology, no finite substance has multiple principal attributes, so the attribution of 
two natures to the soul will look like an unclear expression of dualistic mind-body union (as 
Descartes interprets Elisabeth) or like a kind of materialism, with extension taken to be the real 
principal attribute, and consciousness to be an accidental or emergent attribute (as Shapiro reads 
her). Elisabeth’s point, in my view, was a more radical one, which challenged the underlying 
Scholastic ontology. As we will see, she expressed scepticism about the way Descartes defines 
the principal attribute and modes of the mind, especially about its being characterised in merely 
negative terms, as ‘immateriality’ or ‘nonextendedness’. She appears to have allowed for the pos-
sibility of a finite mental substance with multiple principal attributes. If one substance can genuinely 
 I use ‘extension’ here to mean spatial location, and not in the more rarified Scholastic sense of 4
‘having parts outside parts’, as opposed to being holenmeric, or ‘whole in the whole and whole in 
the parts’. Although there is some scholarly debate about holenmerism in Descartes (Rozemond 
2003), Elisabeth regarded holenmerism as incoherent — ‘the contradiction of the Scholastics, that 
it is both as a whole in the whole body and as a whole in each of its parts’ (1 July 1643, repr. in 
Shapiro 2007a, p. 72) — so it can be safely assumed that she would not have endorsed Descartes’ 
view if she had thought that it entailed a commitment to holenmerism. 
 For Descartes and the Scholastics, though not for Aristotle, strictly speaking only God is capable 5
of independent existence. Created substances depend for their existence on God, who has multi-
ple principal attributes. I will set this issue aside since it does not affect the content of any of the 
arguments discussed here, which pertain only to finite substances.
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possess two natures, neither reducible to or equivalent to the other, Elisabeth can consistently hold 
that the soul is both conscious and extended, without endorsing materialism. Not only is she under 
no theoretical pressure to reduce thought to extension, she need not prioritise one of these attrib-
utes as the real, underlying principal attribute. In her case, raising the question of multiple natures 
is therefore compatible with a kind of dualism. 
The arguments of the Meditations nowhere explicitly defend Descartes’ substance-mode 
ontology. Having established that our conscious states are inseparable from us, and later proved to 
her satisfaction the existence of God and the external world, the meditator concludes in favour of 
the real distinction of mind and body on the grounds that they have very different properties. The 
mind is indivisible, the body, divisible. The mind is clearly and distinctly perceived to be thinking 
and non-extended, the body is distinctly perceived to be extended and non-thinking.  While a case 6
is built for the distinction between mind and body, very little space is devoted to explaining their 
union. It may be that Descartes saw no need to defend or explain either his substance-mode on-
tology or the union of mind and body because his main audience, the Scholastics, already accept-
ed these assumptions. Scholastic hylomorphism takes soul-body union entirely for granted. All 
matter is informed by some form, and matter which is ensouled is just a special case of informa-
tion. Scholastics took the controversial issue to be the real distinction between, not the union of, 
mind and body. Elisabeth, by contrast, queried hylomorphism and pressed for an explanation of 
the union and interaction of mind and body. 
Mind and Body in the Descartes-Elisabeth Correspondence
In her first letter to Descartes, Elisabeth raised a problem of mind-body interaction for his 
dualism as presented in the Meditations, which she had recently read. Assuming the mechanistic 
physics they both subscribed to, she asked how its explanation of motion could be extended to the 
case of mental states causing motion in the body. 
‘I ask you please to tell me how the soul of a human being (it being only a thinking 
substance) can determine the bodily spirits, in order to bring about voluntary actions. For it 
seems that all determination of movement happens though the impulsion of the thing 
moved, by the manner in which it is pushed by that which moves it, or else by the particular 
qualities and shape of the surface of the latter. Physical contact is required for the first two 
conditions, extension for the third. You entirely exclude the one [extension] from the notion 
you have of the soul, and the other [physical contact] appears to me incompatible with an 
immaterial thing. This is why I ask you for a more precise definition… of its substance 
separate from its action, that is, from thought' (Elisabeth to Descartes, 6 May 1643,  repr. in 
Shapiro 2007a, p. 62)
Descartes answered that mind-body interaction is only explicable with reference to mind-body 
union, a primitive notion in its own right, and not to be understood on the model of interaction be-
tween bodies. He invoked the Scholastic conception of gravity, which acts on a body without phys-
ical contact, as a model for understanding how the mind acts on the body (Descartes to Elisabeth, 
21 May 1643, repr. in Shapiro 2007a, p. 66). Elisabeth responded with polite puzzlement.
‘I admit that it would be easier for me to concede matter and extension to the soul than to 
concede the capacity to move a body and be moved by it to an immaterial thing. For, if the 
first is achieved through information, it would be necessary that the spirits, which cause the 
movements, were intelligent, a capacity you accord to nothing corporeal. And even though, 
in your Metaphysical Meditations, you show the possibility of the second, it is altogether 
 This interpretation of Descartes’ epistemological argument, different varieties of which are ad6 -
vanced by Wilson (1978 pp. 197-8) and Williams (1979, p. 113) is in my view preferable to one 
which takes Descartes to infer dualism from our ability to doubt the body but not the mind. The lat-
ter yields an obviously invalid argument. Wilson’s and Williams’ interpretations are more charitable 
to Descartes.
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very difficult to understand that a soul, as you have described it, after having had the faculty 
and the custom of reasoning well, can lose all of this by some vapours, and that, being able 
to subsist without the body, and having nothing in common with it, the soul is still so 
governed by it.' (Elisabeth to Descartes, 10 June 1643, repr. in Shapiro 2007a, p. 68)
It is easy to see how Elisabeth might be read as a materialist here. Her remarks strikingly resem-
ble, for example, those of the self-professed materialist Margaret Cavendish some twenty years 
later: ‘I cannot conceive, how a Spirit … can have the effects of a body, being none it self’ (1664, p. 
197). Although the materialist reading appears natural at first sight, I think there is more to the sto-
ry.  According to my alternative interpretation, Elisabeth’s views are Cartesian in spirit and compat-
ible with dualism. In addition, I argue, Elisabeth made a positive proposal for a new direction a 
Cartesian-inspired dualist might take while distinguishing herself more clearly from Scholasticism 
than even Descartes himself had done.
A Modified Cartesianism: Highlighting Elisabeth’s Anti-Scholastic Metaphysical Views
I read Elisabeth as favouring a roughly Cartesian metaphysics with some modifications, primarily 
to purge it of the remnants of Scholasticism. While on balance she preferred Descartes’ account to 
those of his Scholastic and his materialist opponents, she nevertheless believed more research 
into the nature of both the body and the mind was necessary. She had already asked Descartes, in 
her very first letter, for ‘a more precise definition of the soul’, and would continue to press for one 
over the course of their exchange. She is best interpreted as proposing that the solution to the 
mind-body problem must lie in further empirical and philosophical investigation into the properties 
of the mind.
What speaks in favour of my interpretation of Elisabeth? One clue is that in the passage 
quoted above, she appears to be resisting typically Scholastic explanations in terms of a formal 
cause. As a proponent of mechanistic physics, Elisabeth refers to her opposition to the hylomor-
phic doctrine of ‘information’, that is, form imposing itself on matter. Shapiro (2007, p. 68, n. 12) 
suggests that ‘information’ and ‘spirits’ might equally be taken to refer to Stoic pneuma. Given that 
Elisabeth was addressing Descartes’ views on mind-body interaction, and specified ‘bodily spirits’ 
in her previous letter, it seems more plausible that she meant to refer to the ‘animal spirits’ 
Descartes invokes, an idea derived from Galen (Kühn (ed.) 1822). Descartes, who had a keen in-
terest in anatomy, strove for a philosophy of mind which, unlike hylomorphism, was in harmony 
with the mechanistic physiological science of his day. He proposed a conception of the nervous 
system as thin tubes containing animal spirits with the power to move ventricles in the brain (1985 
[1633], 1985 [1647/8]). Elisabeth wanted to know how the immaterial soul could make these ani-
mal spirits move. She rebuffed Descartes' attempts to frame mind-body causation in terms of the 
Aristotelian conception of gravity. Aristotelian gravity, after all, was supposed to be a kind of formal 
causation, a throwback to hylomorphism. Elisabeth’s preferred mechanistic physics only counte-
nanced the efficient cause, and an explanation in terms of efficient causes is what she wanted 
Descartes to provide. What exactly, she asked, is the mechanistic, efficient cause of the movement 
of the animal spirits, since it certainly is not any such thing as an Aristotelian formal cause?
Another clue is found in the sentences immediately preceding the ones quoted above.
 ‘[I am] unable to comprehend, by appeal to the idea you once had of heaviness, the idea 
through which we must judge how the soul (nonextended and immaterial) can move the 
body; nor why this power to carry the body toward the centre of the earth, which you earlier 
falsely attributed to a body as a quality, should sooner persuade us that a body can be 
pushed by some immaterial thing, than the demonstration of a contrary truth (which you 
promise in your physics) should confirm us in the opinion of its impossibility … since no 
material cause presents itself to the senses, one would then attribute this power to its 
contrary, an immaterial cause. But I nevertheless have never been able to conceive of such 
an immaterial thing as anything other than a negation of matter which cannot have any 
communication with it.’ (Elisabeth to Descartes, 10 June 1643, repr. in Shapiro 2007a, p. 
68) 
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Echoing Descartes’ own complaint that the Scholastics’ invocation of ‘real qualities’ was a sham 
explanation, ‘just the same as saying we perceive something in the objects whose nature we do 
not know’ (1985 [1644], p. 218), I read Elisabeth here as making a comparable complaint about the 
Aristotelian conception of gravity. No useful insight is to be found in it, since it reveals nothing posi-
tive about the nature of the causes involved. Elisabeth can be seen to express dissatisfaction with 
Descartes’ use of the merely negative predicate ‘immaterial’, which tells us nothing about the sub-
stance it applies to other than that it is not material. But Descartes, who sometimes used ‘immater-
ial’ interchangeably with ‘thinking’, apparently took it to characterise the nature of a substance. As I 
interpret this passage, Elisabeth challenged Descartes in this letter to provide some positive rea-
son to equate ‘immaterial’ with ‘thinking’ or ‘conscious’. We find her obliquely drawing attention to 
the fact that the predicates might have distinct extensions: Aristotelians thought of gravity as imma-
terial but non-conscious. Descartes’ example contradicts rather than corroborates his case. And 
merely negative characterisations of substances leave us in the dark as to their nature, character-
istic behaviour and causal powers. Elisabeth asked Descartes to leave such quasi-Scholastic 
moves behind, and provide an up-to-date explanation in terms of efficient causes, compatible with 
mechanistic physics, of the relationship between mind and body.
Descartes, to Elisabeth’s disappointment, never did provide the account she had request-
ed. Yet it seems that he saw her point to some extent, as he corrected himself in his next letter, 
admitting that the gravity analogy had been unhelpful. What he had meant to say, he claimed, was 
that ‘things which pertain to the union of the soul and body are known only obscurely by the under-
standing … but they are known very clearly by the senses’ (Descartes 28 June 1643, repr. in 
Shapiro 2007a, p. 71). That is, as Rozemond (1998, p. 183) puts it, mind-body causation can only 
be understood phenomenologically. 
Elisabeth conceded, in her reply, that ‘the senses show me that the soul moves the body’ 
but remained dissatisfied because ‘they teach me nothing (no more than do the understanding and 
the imagination) of the way in which it does so’ (Elisabeth 1 July 1643, repr. in Shapiro 2007a, p. 
72). Her mention of the ‘senses’ refers to the mental mode of phenomenological awareness of 
mind-body interaction — that is, the subjective experience of such interaction from the inside out, 
rather than as an outside observer — as can be seen from her grouping them with other Cartesian 
modes of the mind, imagination and understanding. So her words should not be taken to imply that 
third-personal scientific observations could not form the basis of a solution to the interaction prob-
lem. On the contrary, a more scientifically informed account of the soul is exactly what Elisabeth 
asks for next.
 ‘I think that there are some properties of the soul, which are unknown to us, which could 
perhaps overturn what your Metaphysical Meditations persuaded me of by such good 
reasoning: the nonextendedness of the soul. This doubt seems to be founded on the rule 
that you give there, in speaking of the true and the false, that all error comes to us in 
forming judgments about that which we do not perceive well enough. Though extension is 
not necessary to thought, neither is it at all repugnant to it, and so it could be suited to 
some other function of the soul which is no less  essential to it.’ (Elisabeth 1 July 1643, 7
repr. in Shapiro 2007a, p. 72)
I read this passage as Elisabeth contesting Descartes’ claim that the ‘nonextendedness’ of 
the soul is clearly and distinctly perceived. Though agreeing with Descartes that thinking could not 
be explained reductively by mechanistic physics (Descartes 1985 [1637] p. 140) — ‘extension is 
not necessary to thought’— she considered it logically consistent to suppose both thought and ex-
tension belonged to the soul. Descartes’ Scholastic substance-attribute ontology dictated that each 
finite substance must have exactly one principal attribute to which all its modes belong (Descartes 
1985 [1644] p. 210). But Elisabeth, who yearned to replace Scholasticism with mechanistic science 
 This is translated ‘less essential to her’ in Blom’s edition. The pronoun ‘her’ in his translation 7
refers to the feminine French word for the soul (âme).
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and a philosophy respectful of it, is best interpreted here as challenging this dogma. From the point 
of view of first philosophy, Elisabeth argued, the proposition that something extended thinks is not 
contradictory or clearly and distinctly false (‘repugnant’). She took this proposition, that a sub-
stance has both extension and thought as its principal (‘essential’) attributes without one having to 
be reduced to the other, to have great potential for making Cartesian philosophy consistent with 
modern physics.
On my reading, Elisabeth’s call for further investigation into the ‘unknown properties’ of the 
soul in order that it can be ‘perceived well enough’ was likely intended to have an empirical com-
ponent. While praising Descartes’ first-philosophy based investigations, she clearly stated that 
gaps in our knowledge remained, gaps which we reflexively fill in erroneous ways. It seems that 
the first-philosophy method had been exhausted and yielded insufficient data. To keep us from er-
ror, according to Elisabeth, we must come to clearly perceive the soul by other means.
Twice Elisabeth asked Descartes for improved definitions of the soul not relying on merely 
negative, uninformative descriptions like ‘nonextendedness’ or ‘immateriality’. Once she suggest-
ed, quite clearly but so briefly that it is easily missed, that even ‘thinking’ is an insufficient definition 
of a primary attribute for the soul. Thought, she claimed, is not an attribute but an ‘action’. Thinking 
is something which a mental substance does. It does not follow that thinking constitutes the es-
sence of what a mental substance is. Elisabeth gave two examples of cases where a soul might 
exist without thinking: before birth, and while unconscious. ‘I ask you for a more precise definition 
of the soul … of its substance separate from its action, that is, from thought. For even if we were to 
suppose them inseparable (which is however difficult to prove in the mother’s womb or in great 
fainting spells) … we could, in considering them apart, acquire a more perfect idea of them’ (Elisa-
beth 6 May 1643, repr. in Shapiro 2007a, p. 62). 
Elisabeth appears to have held that there was insufficiently strong philosophical and empir-
ical evidence to identify the principal attribute of mental substance. Since neither immateriality nor 
thought were good candidates for the principal attribute of mental substance, in her view, this at-
tribute remained to be discovered, and might be compatible with that of extension.
 
Against the Materialist Interpretation of Elisabeth
Shapiro, who reads Elisabeth as a materialist, admits that Elisabeth was never a reductive materi-
alist, since she held that ‘extension is not necessary to thought’ (2007b, p. 42). Her resistance to 
reductionism puts Elisabeth at odds with the materialists of her day. The prominent seventeenth-
century materialists Hobbes, Gassendi and Cavendish  advocated reductionism about the mind, 8
predicting that a future science would explain all mental phenomena in terms of interaction be-
tween material bodies. We can be sure that Elisabeth had not read Cavendish, who was five years 
her junior and only began to work on materialism in the 1660s. But her later letters to Descartes 
reveal that she was familiar with the works of Hobbes and Gassendi. Were she a materialist, we 
might expect her to ‘find their views appealing’ as Tollefsen (1999, p. 73) conjectures. In fact we 
see Elisabeth being dismissive in the extreme of exactly two sets of  Objections to the Meditations: 
those by Hobbes and those by Gassendi. Upon being sent the French edition by Descartes, Elisa-
beth wrote, ‘M. Gassendi, who has such a reputation for knowledge, made, after the Englishman, 
the least reasonable objections of all’ (Elisabeth, 5 December 1647, repr. in Shapiro 2007a, p. 
167). Her verdict is not wholly surprising given the respect for Cartesian dualism she had ex-
pressed in earlier letters.  Where these reductive materialists had disparaged Descartes’ argu-
ments for the real distinction, Elisabeth praised those arguments as persuasive and ‘such good 
reasoning’ (Elisabeth 1 July 1643, repr. in Shapiro 2007a, p. 72). In addition to her negative claims 
about Hobbes and Gassendi, in 1647 Elisabeth continued to urge refinements to Cartesian physics 
and dualism. About a treatise on physics by Descartes' disciple Hogelande, she raised the concern 
 Cavendish’s early philosophical writings (1664) suggest reductive materialism: she considers our 8
minds and thoughts to be entirely located in the natural, material world (see also Detlefsen 2007), 
But Cavendish is open to the possibility that immaterial things, such as God, exist outside nature, 
outside the comprehension of our material minds (1664 p. 315). An anonymous referee also points 
out that the reductionist interpretation fits less well with her later Observations (2001 [1668]). 
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that ‘the subtle matter, which [Hogelande] supposes to be enveloped in a coarser one by the heat 
of fire or by fermentation, is nevertheless corporeal and receives its pressure or its movement by 
the quantity and surfaces of its small parts. The soul, which is immaterial, could not do this’ (Elisa-
beth May 1647, repr. in Shapiro 2007a, p. 163). 
Although these facts are compatible with an interpretation of Elisabeth as an atypical, non-
reductive materialist (or, alternatively, a property dualist), other statements of hers are hard to 
square with any sort of materialist reading. Elisabeth maintained that thought is logically compati-
ble with extension, but a completely separate function from it, and not necessary to it. It is difficult 
to see how a view according to which matter is not necessary to thought could be a kind of materi-
alism. Although her letter from May 1647 quoted above makes clear that she continued to puzzle 
over the interaction problem, in her later letters Elisabeth appears to have endorsed a dualism 
even stronger than property dualism, and spoke of the soul as being able to exist without the body. 
Opposing the views of Descartes’ English critic Digby, she wrote, ‘it is impossible to doubt that it 
[the soul] will not be more happy after its separation from the body’ (Elisabeth 28 October 1645, 
repr. in Shapiro 2007a, p. 123).
A Dualist Interpretation
Elisabeth is best interpreted as a Cartesian thinker, and a dualist, but one who strove for a more 
consistent application of the methods of the new science and philosophy, aiming to bring the two 
into harmony to account for the interaction of mind and body. An opponent of the old Aristotelian 
paradigms, she was palpably disappointed that Descartes’ answer to her query harked back to the 
old obscurantism of formal causes and real qualities. Since first philosophy could not answer the 
question of mind-body interaction, her preferred solution was to explore further empirical enquiry 
into the properties of the mind. 
Although she preferred Descartes' view to that of his materialist opponents as well as to 
that of the hidebound seventeenth-century Scholastics, Elisabeth was not a Cartesian dualist in the 
strict sense. Her statement that ‘a soul … after having had the faculty and the custom of reasoning 
well, can lose all of this by some vapours’ indicates that she found it difficult to accept Descartes’ 
thesis that the understanding operates completely independently of the body. What Wilson calls 
Descartes’ ‘robust’ dualism (Wilson 1978, p. 131), according to which purely intellectual thought 
has no material correlate, cannot easily make sense of bodily states interfering with abstract rea-
soning. Still, Elisabeth contends, we can see such interference occurring, and it calls out for expla-
nation. For this reason among others, Broad (2002, p. 27) regards Elisabeth’s position as most 
akin to that of Henry More, a dualist who independently proposed that the soul might be extended 
some sixteen years later (More 1659). More believed that mental substances had the property of 
extension, allowing them to pervade and operate upon bodies. Elisabeth’s brief remark that ‘exten-
sion … could be suited to some other function of the soul’ might be taken to suggest a view 
similar to or anticipating More’s. We know from their mutual acquaintances Francis Mercury van 
Helmont and Anne Conway that Elisabeth read and approved of More’s works much later, around 
1670-1 (Broad 2002, pp. 27-8).
Elisabeth, even in 1643, had already expressed her openness to considering the overthrow 
of certain metaphysical principles, such as ‘each finite substance has exactly one principal at-
tribute’, if giving them up might yield a better answer to the mind-body problem compatible with the 
new physics. Her attitude was one which in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries we would call 
naturalistic. She suggested that the outcome of empirical investigations into ‘unknown properties of 
the soul’ might ‘overturn what your Metaphysical Meditations persuaded me of by such good rea-
soning’ (Elisabeth 1 July 1643, repr. in Shapiro 2007a, p. 72). In this, Elisabeth resembles contem-
porary naturalistic dualists, who propose substance dualism as a best explanation of the relation-
ship between current physics and current psychology (Janssen-Lauret 2017, Janssen-Lauret and 
Bleau under contract).
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Conclusion
Elisabeth of Bohemia’s letters to Descartes reveal a novel, consistent and interesting solution to 
the mind-body problem. Far from being just a Cartesian handmaiden or an interlocutor who simply 
raised objections without making a positive proposal, Elisabeth was a Cartesian sympathiser and 
an original metaphysician. Elisabeth is best understood, not as a materialist as some of her state-
ments might suggest, but as a philosopher mostly sympathetic to dualism who called for further 
investigation into the properties of the mind. Elisabeth emphatically renounced Aristotelian hylo-
morphism about both physics and the human person. With her strong adherence to the mechanis-
tic account of bodily motion, we can see her urging Descartes to explain how the soul causes the 
bodily spirits to move as a demand for an explanation not relying on Aristotelian formal causation, 
but only the efficient causation used by the empirical science of their day. Elisabeth proposed that 
the soul may have multiple natures, both thinking and extended. Since she did not, like her materi-
alistic contemporaries, believe that thought is reducible to interaction between bodies, I suggest 
her raising the question that the mind may have two natures does not imply materialism, the thesis 
that the two natures are reducible to one. Rather, Elisabeth called into doubt the vestigial Scholas-
ticism of Descartes underlying ontology of substances, attributes and modes. According to her, 
since it is consistent to suppose that something thinking should be extended, Descartes’ insistence 
that each (finite) substance has exactly one principal attribute to which all its modes belong is a 
piece of Scholastic dogma for which there is no independent evidence. Elisabeth held that the true 
nature of the soul is still unknown to us, and that Descartes overlooked this fact since he incorrect-
ly categorises the ‘action’ of thought as an attribute, and identified it without good reason with the 
merely negative, uninformative property of immateriality. Elisabeth’s call to arms for empirical re-
search into the nature of the mind, without presupposing that thought is reducible to physical mo-
tion, adumbrates recent developments in naturalistic dualism which proposes substance dualism 
as a best interpretation of the difference in logical form between physics and current psychology. 
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